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Abstract: In his energetic afterlife form, Michel Foucault (1926-1984) discusses 
his relationship to other luminaries of this pocket sphere for leading intellectuals 
and highlights how his work on the state, governmentality and discourse analysis 
all grew out of the broad French tradition in social science. 
 
IBN has won a ticket in the lottery to visit the so-called Afterglow, a pocket of the 
non-corporeal afterlife realm where leading intellectuals hang out, and has 
decided to spend it on an interview with what was once Michel Foucault. 
 
IBN: You once told another reviewer that the happiest moment in your life came 
when you were run over by a car and thought you would die.1 Well, here you are. 
Happy now? 
 
MF: No. My head is still working at full speed, and I don't even have sex to divert 
me.2 I have become more cerebral than ever, and believe me, it's boring. 
 
IBN: Congratulations on your English, though. During your years at Berkeley, 
students complained.3 I suppose you get no more of that? 
 
MF: I get lots of practice around here. Some of the recent arrivals here are 
Americans, and they are, of course, monolinguals. Even Heidegger, with whom I 
have spent quite some time in conversation, has reneged on his view that 
philosophising can only be done in Greek and German, and is putting his nose to 
the grindstone. Not that he really gets any other system than his own for that. 
You could do with some accent-polishing yourself, by the way. 
 
IBN: Indeed. I'm particularly ashamed of that since my own language 
[Norwegian, IBN] and English were mutually understandable as recently as a 
millennium ago. So except for the boredom, what is it like being, ah, I suppose 
‘dead’ is the word, although it sounds a bit too final, perhaps ‘respawned’? 
 
                                            
1 David Macey, The Lives of Michel Foucault  (New York, NY: Pantheon, 1993). 
2 Michel Foucault, ‘An Ethics of Pleasure’, Foucault Live (Interviews 1966-84), edited by Sylvestre 
Lotringer (New York: Semiotext ([1982] 1989), 257-277. 
3 When I [IBN] translated Michel Foucault,  ‘Omnes et Singulatim: Toward a Critique of Political 
Reason’, Power: Essential Works of Foucault 1954—1984, edited by James D. Faubion, 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, [1980] 2000), 298-325 into Norwegian, I checked the provenience of 
the text to find out whether the translation should be done from the English or French original. A 
librarian at Berkeley could confirm that the written original was in French but that the original 
performance of it was in English so broken that it was hard to follow. 
MF: I try to fight the loss of my corporeal existence by focusing on the good stuff, 
like the unbeatable conversations. Pity that Plato isn't here, though, I would 
really have liked to discuss his ideas on the state with him. With the re-
investment I did in ancient Greek to pursue the first volume of my history of 
sexuality, I even think the exchange could have been rooted in his own concepts, 
although I certainly do hope his English would have been better than my Greek.4 
You may recall that I embraced his general understanding of the state as I 
believe he formulated it in The Statesman, politics as the weaving together of the 
strands of life as a privileged social concern.5 Such a conception spawns a key 
problem, which is what the relationship between the one and the many should 
be, and it’s around that problematique you will find most if not all of my 
interventions.6 There is a line, I think, from all that to Durkheim's 
understanding of the state as a merging of the separate cadre that is the early 
state with subjects, what eventually becomes society. These are at least the 
dominating intertexts in my own work on the state, and it would be nice to have 
that exchange . However, Durkheim is not so easy to talk to on this. He is a 
classic authoritarian, and thinks I have misunderstood capitally by focusing on 
the costs of the merger between state and society. Where I see surveillance, 
control and debilitating norms, he keeps on insisting on all the good that comes 
out of an ever-present socially minded state, like some latter-day social democrat. 
He is right in spotting that his own work on the state was important for me and 
that I stood much of his thinking there on its head, but he refuses to discuss the 
Christian genealogy that I suggest, with the welfare state being not only the 
result of the good citizen but also of the idea that human lamb must have a 
pastor. Clausewitz is much easier, he engages my inversion of his idea of politics 
as an extension of war by other means head on. Durkheim is just too fond of his 
politico-religious project of sacralising a human drive towards a world state. 
Quite stubborn, too, even the existence of his very own propaganda books against 
Germany during the First World War cannot make him see that the world state 
he wanted was a France writ large and that all that is gone now. Well. He is still 
a forefather, and an important one. Durkheim, Mauss, Lévi-Strauss and I still 
play whist every Friday. It's all in the intellectual family, really. 
 
IBN: But you hardly refer to them in your written work? 
 
MF: Of course not, only an ignoramus would not spot the influence.  The no-
reference is, after all, a French tradition of long standing, didn't you know? 
 
IBN: Let's return to Plato, I would have thought that his description in The 
Republic of the perfect state of things, with boys taken from their parents and 
trained by what we translate as the state in the most detailed way would be an 
example of discipline? 
                                            
4 Michel Foucault, The Uses of Pleasure. The History of Sexuality, vol. 2, trans. Robert Hurley 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, [1984] 1985). 
5Foucault, ‘Omnes et Singulatim’. 
6 ‘At the basis of Foucault’s  concerns, one always finds the question of the dissolution of order, 
even if this remained unspecified as a topic’.   Arpád Szakolczai, Max Weber and Michel Foucault: 
Parallel Life-Works (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 232. 
 MF: The vision is there, and since this was a model that captures his thinking 
and so a certain contemporary discourse, I could have opened my book on 
discipline with that, really, instead of giving the example of a 19th century 
English public school. Well, that's all in another lifetime. As to Plato, he simply 
decamped. Sublimed, as we call it here. Went on to yet another plane of 
existence. I bet it is ideal, at least for him (sniggers). Plotinus insists that he is 
still in contact, but that I can only take note of. Dante was absolutely beside 
himself when it was clear that Plato had decamped. Here they both were, in a 
place that is not unlike the place that Dante described, and while Dante was 
quite pleased about that, he was also disappointed that there seemed to be no 
heaven for him to go to. Took him the better part of half a millennium to get over 
it, really, and just as he was about to make it, Plato goes and leaves for what 
Dante now believes is, after all, heaven. Bad luck. 
 
IBN: What do you make of your reception? 
 
MF: Let me say at once that I only have arrivals down here to go on. From what I 
hear, there has been a lot of 'what did he mean' debates. That was to be expected, 
but it is bad news nonetheless. I went out of my way to spell out how I was truer 
to the project in hand and to the quest for what I call truth – truth as understood 
by me -- than to consistency, that I was always making a point of trying out new 
possibilities, and of course that makes for inconsistencies, that was part of the 
point. Ni Dieu, ni maître. I said it again and again, take what you can use for 
your own project and get on with it, look at the local sequences, beware of the 
trans-historical. But no. The other issue is simply a thorn in my side by 
comparison. Bourdieu just joined us. Speaking to him, I understand that he has 
taken a lot of my stuff, rationalised it, and applied it to what he thinks of as 
strategic action. That's all right, I suppose, but the way he seems to bend over 
backwards to hide where he got most of it from strikes me as silly. The boy from 
Bearn always going on about not really fitting in, but always ready to rip off the 
very people he is fighting. Typical ressentiment. The only consolation is that I'm 
not doing all that now. 
 
IBN: Well, it seems to fit what you just referred to the French no-reference 




IBN: Then what? 
 
MF: Feyerabend always wanted to be a cabaret singer, and singing is something 
we can do down here. We're doing scat, mostly. No, no (laughs heartily), I think 
you misunderstand me, I mean singing in harmony. Jazz stuff. 
 
IBN: No more scholarship?  
 
MF: You don't pay attention. I still stick to the adage of acting locally. The power 
relations between energetic beings are really not that complicated. Why ,with my 
favourite carnal focus missing, there's little for me to study. I've turned to 
aesthetics full time. 
 
IBN: I hope you do not mind that I return to the issue of power/knowledge, 
though. Your earlier studies of discipline have, as you know, become part of the 
basic tool kit of social history and theory. I see little reason to go over this mode 
of power, since life in total institutions and your theorisation of it are so well... 
 
MF: I must, if you allow, arrest you. If what I have heard is true, I have been 
misunderstood regarding a basic point. I made remarks to the effect that life had 
become like life in prison. I even said that the point of being critical was not 
being ruled so much, to break out of a prison of our own making. In French, we 
like to speak in metaphors. The Americans are more literally-minded. Some 
people, especially criminologists, have felt it necessary to privilege their own field 
of study by assuming that our lives ARE prison lives. Now, that's rather different 
from saying that they are LIKE prison lives. It is a fundamental misreading, for 
if life had been prison life, then discipline would have been the dominant mode of 
power everywhere -- everywhere in the physical world, that is. There would have 
been little point for me to do all that work on governmentality, for example. 
 
IBN: Well, as long as you use that penal vocabulary, I suppose misunderstanding 
is inevitable, but let's talk about governmentality. As far as I understand what 
was going on in 1970s, your work on the ins and outs of governing from afar was 
actually a response to critics? 
 
MF: A rare case of critics actually helping me with my thinking, yes, for it made 
me add a third mode of power to the two that I had worked with before, which 
were sovereignty – the always present mode of power where we are gaming and 
the result is not given beforehand – and discipline, where that game is heavily 
rigged by the total institution that orchestrates it.7 The critique was really quite 
simple minded:why do you ignore subjects when you do your analyses of 
discipline? Of course I had to, the whole point was that there was no big brother 
behind it all, no subject, only totalitarian thinking that conjured up the practices, 
only institutions like the asylum, the prison, the boarding school. Again, I went 
out of my way to avoid that misunderstanding. I started my book on epistemes 
with a dictionary that was never written, my book on madness with a ship that 
never sailed and my book on prison with a penal system that was never built, 
and what did the historians say? But that Chinese dictionary did not exist! There 
was no such thing as a ship of fools! Bentham's panopticon was not realised for 
almost two centuries! 'No shit, Sherlock', as Dewey said to me the other day, I 
wanted to tease out the power of ways of thinking, and the historians did not get 
it, not even the third time around. Even Peter Burke, whose work I enjoyed, 
                                            
7 ‘The S&M game is very interesting because it is a strategic relation, but it is always fluid. Of 
course, there are roles, but everyone knows very well that those roles can be reversed’; Foucault 
quoted in James Miller, The Passion of Michel Foucault (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 
1993), p. 263. 
made that mistake. Wrote a retort based on the arcane idea that I really thought 
the ship of fools had existed, ha! ha! And still, the critique carried a deeper truth, 
for I was never good on individuals. Individuation, yes. Individuals, no. In my 
books on Hérculine Barbin and Pierre Rivière, it is true, I am more interested in 
using them as examples of how gender and crime is constituted than in them as 
persons.8 Personae, not persons, that was the limitation. My work on 
governmentality did not really make amends for that, for my interest remained 
in individuation, but at least I was able to get at a much wider set of 
individuating practices by introducing the idea of conduct of conduct.  
 
IBN: Your reception in my corner of academia has first and foremost focussed on 
governmentality, but there is also a general interest amongst postcolonialists. 
They are also dissatisfied with the missing individuals. 
 
MF: That was bound to happen. Already when Edward [Said, IBN] published 
Orientalism, he included that passage on how, in the case of Western academic 
representations of the Orient, the writings of a few individuals had been 
important.9 I have no quarrel with that. Dumézil always talked about 
monuments, of how certain texts are key to understanding discourse, and that's 
true enough.10 You know, I hear that discourse analysis has taken off, but I 
hatched the idea only post festum. Once I had a break in Tunisia and started to 
think through what I had really done in Les Mots et Les Choses [English 
translation The Order of Things, IBN] I concluded that the idea of an age's 
episteme was really too muscular, too totalising, too much like Lėvi-Strauss’ idea 
that there are latent structures underlying entire societies.11 I wanted something 
more specific that could capture not the utterances, but the specific social setting 
that could make utterances possible, and the answer was discourse.12 The 
Archaeology [of Knowledge, IBN] was really all an attempt to come to grips with 
                                            
8 ‘Nietzsche was saying how little a man is responsible for his nature, especially in terms of what 
he considered to be his morality. Morality has been constitutive of the individual’s being. The 
individual is contingent, formed by the weight of moral tradition, not really autonomous’. 
Foucault quoted in James Miller, The Passion of Michel Foucault  (New York, NY: Simon & 
Schuster, 1993), on p. 283. 
9 Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin, 1977). 
10 Georges Dumézil (1898-1986) was a leading proto-Indo-Europeanist and mentor of Foucault’s, 
instrumental, among other things, in securing for him a job at Uppsala University and a chair at 
the Collège de France [IBN]. 
11 ‘Both Foucault and the structuralisms are not interested in whether the phenomena they study 
have the serious sense supposed by participants. Thus they reject the view, shared by 
pragmatists such as Dewey, hermeneutic phenomenologists such as Heidegger, and ordinary 
language philosophers such as Wittgenstein, that in order to study linguistic practices one must 
take into account the background of shared practices which make them intelligible’. Hubert L. 
Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Brighton: 
Harvester, 1983), p. 57. 
12 ‘The status of practices was at the heart of the famous exchange between Foucault and Derrida 
that started with Derrida’s lecture on Foucault’s Madness and Civilization (reprinted in Derrida 
1967) and ended with Foucault retorting to his former student that in his work, “discursive traces 
are reduced to textual traces [...] the original is allocated to what is said and not-said in the text, 
so as not to put discursive practices back into the field of transformations in which they were 
carried out”’.  Quoted in Didier Eribon, Michel Foucault, transl. Betzy Wing (London: Faber & 
Faber, [1989]1992), p. 121. 
what, with hindsight, was to become my version of a general break with 
structuralism. Individuals were not the focus here, utterances was, I was out to 
capture what made it possible to say something, as opposed to what was said, 
and how that gave rise to a doxa that constrained the one in his dealings with the 
many. So Edward's critique was fair enough, for he was out to capture a very 
specific contribution made by very specific people. I was not. I am glad you raise 
the question of methodology, though, for that was one of my many bêtes noirs. 
The hunt went on, episteme, discourse, assemblage, dispositif, but it was all an 
attempt at getting to the specificity of social constellations. 
 
IBN: To press the postcolonial issue, you certainly made an attempt at taking 
that hunt beyond Europe, most famously, perhaps, by seeing hope in the Iranian 
revolution? 
 
MF: I must admit that I was flattered when Corriere della Sera wanted me there 
as a correspondent, but I went also exactly because I had focussed so much on the 
Western tradition that I thought I owed it to another tradition to go. And I was 
curious, not least because there were many Iranian intellectuals exiled in Paris. 
What I saw there was excitement, the feeling that something new was being 
created, it was not unlike the bathhouses in San Francisco in that regard, new 
community on unknown ground. It all went wrong, but then again, human 
history is rife with false beginnings. From what I hear, though, globalisation has 
really taken off and you all have to relate to other traditions on a regular basis 
now. A very important change. When I was in Tunis, the memory of colonialism 
was still so fresh that local energies had not really been released there and in 
Paris, except for Fanon and some of the students, like Mudimbe, there was not 
really all that much happening. The rights that have been established in our own 
tradition have counterparts elsewhere, and we have to open up to that.13 So, I 
was a bit too excited there to begin with. Although it is an error on a par with my 
short flirt with communism, I have no regrets. If critique is the art of not being 
governed so much, it must include an element of speaking truth to power, and 
that truth has to come from experience; reading experiences, lived experiences. 
Sometimes, the truths will be off. There is a sense in which the process is more 
important than the result. It is, I think, a calculated risk of the parrhesiastic 
calling to fail sometimes.14 
 
IBN: I see from the hourglass sign on my lottery ticket that my time is almost up, 
so, since you dwell on your mistakes, might I ask you to round this out by 
mentioning what you think are your greatest successes?  
 
                                            
13 Foucault defended the right of the Baader-Meinhof-related French lawyer Klaus Croissant to 
travel freely across Europe, while also falling out with Deleuze and Guattari’s stance on the issue, 
which Foucault felt condoned terrorism. Michel Foucault, ‘Va-t-on extrader Klaus Croissant?’, 
Dits et écrits 1954-1988, vol. III 1976-1979 (Paris: Gallimard, [1977] 1994), 361-365; David 
Macey, The Lives of Michel Foucault  (New York, NY: Pantheon, 1993), p. 393. 
14 Foucault is referring to his final work here, which concerned the emergence of the practice of 
speaking truth to power (Gr. parhessia), see his lectures at the Collège de France 1982-83 and 
1983-84. 
MF: Ah. From what I hear, outside of history, the basic genealogical approach of 
asking why exactly something becomes a problem within this or that social 
constellation seems to have caught on. That insight was Nietzsche’s, but I take 
great pleasure in having lent a hand there, for if you ask question in that way, 
you are already on your way towards doing something critical. And then there is 
the other end, the effects of it all, the importance of asking not only why people 
do what they do and if they know what they do, but also if they know what that 
which they do, does. Very few people do. But that is all methodology. If you 
meant in terms of substance, I think that knack for looking at seemingly 
historical stuff in order to criticize the present panned out particularly well when 
it came to globalisation, and also for biopolitics. It is rather nice to look back and 
see that the questions about the governing of health and life that I asked thirty 
years ago are now being asked as if for the first time. 
 
 
 
